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NON-FREGEAN LOGICS
OF ANALYTIC EQUIVALENCE (I)
Abstract
The identity connective is usually interpreted in non-Fregean logic as an operator
representing the identity of situations. This interpretation is related to the modal
criterion of the identity of sentence correlates, characteristic of the WT system
and some stronger systems. However, this connective can also be interpreted
in a diﬀerent way – as an operator representing the identity of propositions.
The “propositional” interpretation is in turn associated with the modal-contents
criterion of the identity of sentence correlates. This begs the question of whether
there is a system of non-Fregean logic, providing an adequate formalization of this
criterion. The aim of the paper is to systematize the metalogical and philosophical
context of the issue and to point to a system that provides its solution.
1. Introduction
The basic intuitive sense of the speciﬁc connective of non-Fregean logic may
be explained by the following semantic rule:
‘p ≡ q’ we read: that p is the same as q.
For example, if p represents “John is the husband of Jane” and q repre-
sents “Jane is the wife of John”, then ‘p ≡ q’ represents “That John is the
husband of Jane is the same as Jane is the wife of John.” The most general
properties of this connective identity are deﬁned by the smallest (in the
sense of inclusion of sets of theses) non-Fregean calculus, or SCI (sentential
calculus with identity). As is known, the SCI language (LSCI) is obtained
from the language of the classical sentential logic by adding the primitive
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symbol “≡”. The consequence relation is deﬁned on this language by the
Modus Ponens rule and the following axioms:
(CL) a set of axioms deﬁning classical sentential logic;
(SCI1) α ≡ α;
(SCI2) (α ≡ β)→ (¬α ≡ ¬β);
(SCI3F ) (α ≡ β) ∧ (γ ≡ δ)→((αFγ) ≡ (βFδ)), for F ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔,≡};
(SCI4) (α ≡ β)→ (α↔ β).
Non-Fregean logic in the narrower sense is the set of calculi including
the SCI and every calculus which is the result of strengthening the SCI.
Non-Fregean logic in the broader sense (NFL) is the set of calculi formulated
in LSCI and containing the set of all SCI theses (of course, these deﬁnitions
only apply to the sentential fragment of non-Fregean logic).
SCI was constructed by Roman Suszko as the basis for building stronger
deductive systems, philosophically interpreted as theories of situations1.
According to this interpretation:
(S) ‘p ≡ q’ we read: that p is the same situation as q.
According to Suszko, the smallest calculus being the philosophically
adequate theory of situations is the WT system. This theory is the result
of strengthening the SCI by the so-called quasi-Fregean rule:
(QF)
α↔ β
α ≡ β
Suszko showed (in [12]) that there is a close relationship between the
WT and the system of modal logic S4. Let g be a function from LS4 (more
precisely: from the set of LS4 formulas) to the LSCI, deﬁned as follows:
f(α) = α, if connective “” does not occur in α,
g(‘α’) = ‘α ≡ (α ≡ α)’,
and the remaining recursive conditions for truth-functional connectives
leave them unchanged. According to one of Suszko’s theorems (concerning
the above WT and S4 relationship), for each formula α of the LS4, the
equivalence holds:
1“Roman Suszko claimed that non-Fregean logic is primarily a tool for formulating
and studying formal aspects of the ontology of situations” ([11], p. 96). Every theory in
SCI closed under the substitution was treated by Suszko as a theory of situations (ibid.).
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(1) α ∈ S4 iﬀ g(α) ∈WT.
In other words, the operator “” deﬁned into the WT system:
(2) α =df α ≡ (α ≡ α)
represents the speciﬁc S4 connective.
One of the theses of the WT system is the formula according to which
the situations described by the sentences are identical if and only if these
sentences necessarily have the same truth value (i.e. they are strictly equiv-
alent):
(WT) (α ≡ β)↔ (α↔ β).
The strict equivalence (in the S4 sense) is often interpreted as a relation
of mutual entailment. With this interpretation, (WT) expresses in the
object language the so-called Wittgensteins principle2.
In accord with (WT), the identity connective in the WT system is
indistinguishable from the strict equivalence connective. Consequently, the
situations described by sentences are identical when these sentences are
strictly equivalent. From now on, we will call this condition the modal
criterion of situational identity3.
In recent years, it was pointed out that some NFL calculi can be – and
perhaps should be – intuitively interpreted according to the rule (cf. [8],
pp. 18–22, [9], p. 265, and [7], p. 71):
(P) ‘p ≡ q’ we read: that p is the same proposition as q.
Formal diﬀerences between interpretations (S) and (P) result from dif-
ferent criteria used for identifying situations and propositions formulated
at the level of their sentence representation. Although the situations are
identiﬁed by the modal criterion, the propositions are identiﬁed with the
assistance of the modal-contents criterion: propositions expressed by the
sentences are identical if and only if these sentences are strictly equivalent,
2“5.122 If p follows from q, the sense of ‘p’ is contained in the sense of ‘q’ [. . .] 5.141
If p follows from q and q from p, then they are one and the same proposition” ([13]).
The term “Wittgenstein’s principle” originates from [16]. The term “WT” comes from
Wittgenstein’s name.
3The modal criterion is the assumption of B. Wolniewicz’s ontology of situations (cf.
[15], p. 20). The main source of inspiration for Suszko when constructing non-Fregean
logic was reading Wolniewicz’s work on the topic of Wittgenstein’s philosophy ([14]).
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and furthermore, there is a certain contents connection between them. For
example, that 2+ 2 = 4 is the same (abstract) situation as that the empty
set is included in each set – but it is not the same proposition: there is no
contents connection between them.
We accept the natural condition: two sentences are in a contents con-
nection, if they are composed of exactly the same terms. In a similar way,
two formulas of propositional calculus are in this connection, if they contain
exactly the same variables.
This raises the question whether there is any NFL calculus providing
an adequate formalization of the modal-contents criterion. The aim of this
work is to sketch the metalogical and philosophical context of this issue, to
systematize its most important assumptions and to indicate a system that
meets adequacy conditions of the formulated task.
2. AE as the smallest logic of analytic equivalence
At the beginning of the eighties of the last century, Jon Barwise and John
Perry drew attention (in [1] and [2]) to the following possibility of clarify-
ing the modal-contents criterion: sentences express the same proposition
(“describe the same situation” in its original terms) when they are logically
equivalent and contain the same extra-logical terms. Ryszard Wo´jcicki pro-
posed (in [17] and [18]) to use this condition in the construction of a system
of non-Fregean predicate logic.
A simple application of this criterion in sentential calculus is the fol-
lowing principle: if formulas α and β are logically equivalent and contain
the same sentential variables, then α and β represent the same proposition.
This principle has become (in [10], [19], and independently in [3], [4]) the
main assumption of the idea of the so-called logic of analytical equivalence.
The smallest system of this logic, designated (in [4]) by the symbol “AE”
is the result of strengthening the SCI by the following rule of inference:
(RQF)
α↔ β
α ≡ β provided that At(α) = At(β)
4.
(RQF) will be further called the restricted quasi-Fregean rule.
The modal-contents criterion is generally expressed in the AE metasys-
tem by the theorem:
4“At(α)” means the collection of all sentential variables occurring in α.
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Theorem 1 (the analytic equivalence principle for AE). The following
equivalence is satisfied, for any α, β ∈ LSCI :
‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE iff ‘α↔ β’ ∈ AE and At(α) = At(β).
Proof. Taking into account (RQF), the proof of the implication from right
to left is obvious.
In turn, in virtue of (SCI4) and (MP), we hold that if ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE,
then ‘α ↔ β’ ∈ AE. It is therefore suﬃcient to show that the following
implication holds:
(3) If ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE, then At(α) = At(β).
For this purpose, let us assume that v is any valuation function and hv
is the (unique) extension of this function on the LSCI language, deﬁned as
follows:
(i) hv(p) = 1 iﬀ v(p) = 1,
(ii) hv(¬α) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = 0,
(iii) hv(α ∧ β) = 1 iﬀhv(α) = hv(β) = 1,
(iv) hv(α ∨ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = 1 or hv(β) = 1,
(v) hv(α→ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = 0 or hv(β) = 1,
(vi) hv(α↔ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = hv(β),
(vii) hv(α ≡ β) = 1 iﬀ hv(α) = hv(β) & At(α) = At(β).
Let us assume that W is a property owned by some formulas deﬁned
as follows: W (α) =df h
v(α) = 1, for every valuation v. On the one hand,
considering (ii)-(vi), each axiom of the (CL) has the property W . Taking
into account (vii), in turn, the axioms under schemes (SCI1)-(SCI4) possess
it. On the other hand, the two primitive rules of the AE system (i.e., (MP)
and (QF)) preserve the property W . Consequently, the following condition
is satisﬁed:
If α ∈ AE, then hv(α) = 1, for every α ∈ LSCI, for every valuation v.
In particular:
If ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE, then hv(‘α ≡ β’) = 1,
where directly – by (vii) – we obtain (3). 
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The ﬁrst segment on the right side of the proved theorem stating a kind
of “logical” necessity of equivalence for ‘α ↔ β’ (in the sense of necessity
of the AE theses) is the metalogical counterpart of the modal criterion. In
turn, two formulas possessing exactly the same variables reﬂect the fact
that there is a direct contents connection between sentences represented by
these formulas. Thus, the analytic equivalence theorem states the fact that
the equality ‘α ≡ β’ is a logical thesis if and only if α and β are logically
equivalent (on the basis of AE), and they represent sentences which are in
a contents connection. There is no doubt that this theorem comprises the
metalogical counterpart of the modal-contents criterion.
3. The Nowak’s logic of analytic equivalence
Is the modal-contents criterion expressible in the LSCI (object) language?
Analyses in [9] bring us closer to answering this question. Marek Nowak
introduced – with the help of the metalogical deﬁnition – a connective
marked by the symbol “‖” (ibid., p. 268):
(4) α ‖ β =df (α ≡ α) ≡ (β ≡ β).
The connective can be – according to the intentions of the author –
interpreted as an operator representing the occurrence of the contents con-
nection between sentences represented by the arguments of the operator.
Regardless of its formal and semantical analysis (such an analysis is in-
cluded in Nowak’s work), we can justify the accuracy of the interpretation
already based on a general and intuitive level. The reasoning is as follows.
According to the modal-contents criterion, the deﬁniens of the above
deﬁnition is true if and only if the equalities ‘(α ≡ α)’ and ‘(β ≡ β)’
are strictly equivalent, and are contents connected. Under the axioms
(CL), (SCI1) and the (QF) rule, they are strictly equivalent. Thus, the
question of the truthfulness of the deﬁniens boils down to the question of
the existence of contents connection between them. Let’s accept the rule:
for every sentence γ, γ is related in contents with ‘γ ≡ γ’. Assuming that
the relevant relationship (i.e. the contents connection) is transitive and
symmetric, we conclude that the deﬁniens is true if and only if sentences
α and β are contents connected to each other.
We will call such interpreted symbol “‖” the contents connective.
Let us note the following fact.
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Fact 1. The contents connective is indistinguishable in WT from the
verum connective:
(5) ‘α ‖ β’ ∈WT, for every α, β ∈ LSCI.
Proof. Taking into consideration (CL) and (SCI1), the following formula
is a thesis of WT:
(α ≡ α)↔ (β ≡ β), for any α, β ∈ LSCI.
Hence, under (QF), we obtain a formula identical to the deﬁniens of (4).
This fact shows that WT is not an adequate basis for the NFL system
design with the contents connective.
In the cited paper, Nowak presented a certain NFL system, providing
an axiomatic characterization of this connective. This system is the result
of the extension of the SCI by the list of axioms (its only primitive rule of
inference is (MP)):
(N1) α ‖ ¬α,
(N2f ) (αfβ) ‖ (α ≡ β), where f ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔},
(N3) (α ‖ β) ∧ (γ ‖ δ)→ ((α ≡ γ) ‖ (β ≡ δ)),
(N4) (α ≡ α) ‖ α,
(N5) (α ≡ β) ‖ (β ≡ α),
(N6) (α ≡ (β ≡ γ)) ‖ ((α ≡ β) ≡ γ),
(N7) (α ≡ β)→ ((α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β)),
(N8) ((α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β))→ (α ≡ β).
In that paper, the proofs of the completeness theorem and the semantic
version of the analytic equivalence theorem were given. According to them
the following version of the analytic equivalence theorem holds:
Theorem 2 (the analytic equivalence principle for Nowak’s system; cf. [9],
p. 269). ‘α ≡ β’ is a thesis of Nowak’s system iff ‘α ↔ β’ is a thesis of
Nowak’s system and At(α) = At(β), for any α, β ∈ LSCI.
Thus, this system meets the metalogical version of the modal-contents
criterion for propositional identity. Does it also meet its objectual version?
More speciﬁcally: is there a thesis of Nowak’s system which adequately
expresses this criterion?
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The answer to this question is negative. Actually, the thesis of the
system which is of interest to us is the following formula (which is quite
easy to check by using semantical techniques introduced by Nowak):
(6) (p ≡ q)↔ ((p↔ q) ∧ (p ‖ q)),
However, the symbol “” (introduced by deﬁnition (2)) does not rep-
resent in this system the necessity connective but the assertion connective.
It results from the fact:
Fact 2. The thesis of Nowak’s system is the following formula:
(∗) α ≡ α.
Proof. The formula ‘α→ α’ is the thesis of SCI (among others, under
(SCI1) and (SCI4)). The reverse implication is obtained by substituting
β/‘α ≡ α’ in the N8 (and by using CL and N4). As a result, we obtain the
equivalence:
α↔ α.
Hence, based on the analytical equivalence theorem for the considered
system, we derive the conclusion that the formula (∗) is its thesis. 
This fact proves that Nowak’s system is not an adequate foundation for
constructing such a theory in SCI, in which the modal-contents criterion of
propositional identity would be expressible.
The conjunction of (N7) and (N8) directly provides the criterion of
identity of propositions, according to which the propositions expressed by
sentences are identical if and only if these sentences have the same truth
value, and there is a contents connection between them, formally:
(N7,8) (p ≡ q)↔ ((p↔ q) ∧ (p ‖ q)).
At this point in our considerations, the following doubt could occur:
since we have a complete system providing us with the “truth-contents”
criterion of propositional identity (N7,8), is it not enough to accept this
criterion (abandoning the modal-contents criterion)?
There are counterexamples for (N7,8). Let us replace q/‘p ≡ p’ in
(N7,8). Hence and from N4 (and CL) we can derive:
p→ (p ≡ (p ≡ p)).
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Let p represents the sentence “Warsaw is the capitol of Poland”. This
sentence is true, so we obtain:
(a) Warsaw is the capital of Poland
is the same proposition as
(b) that Warsaw is the capital of Poland is the same proposition as
Warsaw is the capital of Poland.
But these sentences do not express the same propositions: (a) is an
empirical truth and (b) is a logical one (as we can see, it is a propositional
version of the Morning Star Paradox).
The troubles increase, if we extend (in a natural way) the SCI language
to the language containing individual names and predicates. Let us replace
in (N8): p/‘Rab ∧Qcd’ and q/‘Rcb ∧Qab’ (e.g. Rab ∧Qcd may represent
“John is older than Jane and Peter is taller than she is,” and Rcb∧Qab may
represent “Peter is older than Jane and John is taller than she is.”). It is
possible to have a situation in which both of these statements are true. In
addition, there is a contents connection between them (they are composed
of exactly the same terms). Thus, according to the (N7,8), these sentence
should express the same proposition; but they do not express it.
As we can see, the modal-contents criterion cannot be replaced – it
is in danger of being in conﬂict with our basic intuitions – through the
“truth-contents” criterion.
4. The problem of strengthening of the logic
In order to compare the two recently considered systems of philosophical
logic, we note the following fact:
Fact 3. (N1), (N2), (N4), (N5), (N6), (N7) ∈ AE.
Proof. Ad (N1), (N2), (N4)-(N6): the proof is obvious, taking into
account the appropriate laws of SCI and the rule (RQF). Ad (N7): from
(SCI4) and (SCI3≡). 
In contrast to Nowak’s system, the necessity connective is distinguish-
able in AE from the classical assertion connective.
Fact 4. ‘α↔ α’ 6∈ AE.
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Proof. The basis of the proof is the mentioned (in section 1) Suszko’s
theorem on the interpretability of WT in S4. Taking into account the fact
that the RQF rule is weaker than QF (and the fact that the set of AE
axioms is identical to the set of SCI axioms), we obtain the conclusion that
all AE theses are WT theses. As is known, the formula ‘α↔ α’ is not an
S4 thesis. Thus, the corresponding (via the function g deﬁned in section 1)
formula ‘(α ≡ (α ≡ α))↔ α’ is also not a WT thesis and – what is more –
it is not an AE thesis. 
As we can see, both the contents connective and the necessity connec-
tive are nontrivially deﬁnable in the AE system. Thus, it seems that the AE
or its strengthening may provide convenient tools to formalize the modal-
contents criterion. This begs the question of what such strengthening looks
like. Before analyzing this issue, we turn our attention to a fundamental
question that might arise in this context.
5. The Golin´ska-Pilarek’s question
One of the thesis of the SCI is (taking into account (CL) and (SCI4)) the
following formula:
(7) ((p ≡ q) ∧ p)↔ ((p ≡ q) ∧ q).
Hence (in virtue of (RQF)) we obtain as a thesis of the AE:
(8) ((p ≡ q) ∧ p) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ q).
The comments [5] and paper [6] expressed some doubt associated with
an intuitive interpretation of the theses (8). Assuming that p represents
“2 + 2 = 4” and q represents “2 + 2 = 5”, we obtain the sentence:
(a) (2 + 2 = 4 ≡ 2 + 2 = 5) and 2 + 2 = 4
is the same proposition as:
(b) (2 + 2 = 4 ≡ 2 + 2 = 5) and 2 + 2 = 5.
Are not this consequence paradoxical and, consequently, is the AE sys-
tem not an overly strong basis for formalizing the modal-contents criterion?
The source of this doubt is the belief that two complex sentences, if
they are synonymous and have the same structure, they also have the
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same “intensional structure” in which the corresponding simple sentences
are synonymous. In the case of (a) and (b), this assumption takes the form:
(∗) ((r ∧ p) ≡ (r ∧ q))→ (p ≡ q).
It is easy to point to counterexamples for (∗). Let us make a substi-
tution: r/‘p ∧ q’. Following a few simple transformations of (∗), we obtain
the formula:
(∗∗) ((p ∧ q) ≡ (p ∧ q))→ (p ≡ q).
The implication (∗∗) is obviously false: it directly leads to the conse-
quence that all sentences are synonymous. A general intuition about the
“intensional isomorphism” of complex sentences at the same time turns out
to be inaccurate. Nor are there any particular reasons to accept a similar
intuition in relation to sentences such as (a) and (b).
The above analysis may raise the question of whether there is any equiv-
alence condition analogous to (∗), but weaker. It turns out that a positive
answer to this question coincides with the main theme of our research.
6. The AE+ system
Let us suppose that r represents a sentence that is necessarily true, and p
and q are contents connected with each other. Under these assumptions,
the thesis (∗) does not raise intuitive objections. Therefore, it seems that
this kind of a modiﬁcation of this thesis may be a new axiom for the
considered strengthening of the AE system.
Let AE+ be the least system containing SCI, the axiom (N3) (i.e.
Nowak’s axiom, see section 3) and the formula:
(+) (α ∧ (β ‖ γ)) ∧ ((α ∧ β) ≡ (α ∧ γ))→ (β ≡ γ)
closed on Modus Ponens and (RQF). Obviously, AE is a subsystem of AE+.
Theorem 3 (the analytic equivalence theorem for AE+). For any α, β ∈
LSCI:
(9) ‘α ≡ β’ ∈ AE+ iff ‘α↔ β’ ∈ AE+ and At(α) = At(β).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Theorem 4. AE
+ is a subsystem of WT.
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Proof. The essence of the proof is to demonstrate the relevance of two
conditions: (a) the formula (N3) is the WT thesis, and (b) the formula (+)
is the WT thesis.
Ad (a): the proof is obvious, taking into account Fact 1.
Ad (b): According to Fact 1, the proof of this condition boils down to
deriving this formula from system WT:
(+′) (α ∧ ((α ∧ β) ≡ (α ∧ γ)))→ (β ≡ γ).
To this end, it suﬃces to note that the formula:
(+′′) (α ∧((α ∧ β)↔ (α ∧ γ)))→ (β ↔ γ).
is a tautology of the S4 system. By virtue of Suszko’s theorem, WT is
interpretable in S4 due to the translation of f (from LSCI into LS4), whose
speciﬁc condition is the equality:
f(‘(α ≡ β)’) = ‘(α↔ β)’.
More speciﬁcally, in accord with the Suszko’s theorem, the following
equivalence occurs ([12], cf. [11], p. 108):
(10) α ∈WT iﬀ f(α) ∈ S4.
Using this equivalence in the formula (+′′), we conclude that (+′) is
the thesis of WT. 
Theorem 5.
(a) ‘α↔ α’ 6∈ AE+.
(b) ‘(α ≡ β)↔ (α↔ β)’ 6∈ AE+.
(c) If At(α) 6∈ At(β), then ‘α ‖ β’ 6∈ AE+.
Proof. None of the formulas (a) and (b) is a counterpart of the S4 thesis,
therefore, none of them is - by virtue of Suszko’s theorems - the WT thesis.
What is more, taking into account Theorem 4, none of them is thesis AE+.
The condition (c) is derived from the analytical equivalence theorem for
AE
+ (i.e. Theorem 3) by substitutions: α/‘α ≡ α’, β/‘β ≡ β’. 
7. Modal characterization of AE+
In the ﬁnal section, we will derive two theorems characterizing some modal
features of the AE+ system.
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Theorem 6. If g is the function defined as in section 1, then the following
condition is satisfied:
(11) ‘α’ ∈ S4 iﬀ g(α) ∈ AE+.
Proof. The implication from right to left follows from Theorem 4 and
Suszko’s theorem:
‘α’ ∈ S4 iﬀ g(α) ∈WT.
In order to obtain the reverse implication, we will derive in AE+ all
counterparts of the speciﬁc S4 axioms and a counterpart of Go¨del’s rule.
The proofs will often use the rule of extensionality (standardly derivable
in SCI based on (CL), (SCI2) and (SCI3F )):
(Ext)
(α ≡ β)→ γ
(α ≡ β)→ γ(α//β)
In the remainder of the proof, we will derive further counterparts of S4
axioms:
(a) (α→ β) ∧α→ β,
(b) α→ α,
(c) α→ α,
and the counterpart of Go¨del’s rule:
(G) α
α
Ad (a)
1. ((α≡(α≡α))∧(β ‖(β≡β)))∧((α∧β)≡(α∧(β≡β)))→(β≡(β≡β)) (+)
2. β ‖ (β ≡ β) SCI1, CL, RQF
3. ((α ≡ (α ≡ α))→ [((α ∧ β) ≡ (α ∧ (β ≡ β)))→ β] 1, 2, CL, Def.
4. ((α≡(α≡α))→ [(((α≡α)∧β)≡((α ≡ α)∧(β ≡ β)))→ β] 3, Ext
5. ((α ≡ α) ∧ β) ≡ ((α ≡ α)→ β) SCI1, CL, RQF
6. ((α ≡ α) ∧ (β ≡ β)) ≡ ((α→ β) ≡ (α→ β)) SCI1, CL, RQF
7. ((α ≡ (α ≡ α))→ [(((α ≡ α)→ β) ≡ ((α→ β) ≡ (α→ β)))→ β]
4, 5, 6, Ext, CL
8. ((α ≡(α ≡ α))→ [((α→ β)≡((α→ β)≡(α→ β)))→ β] 7, Ext
9. α→ ((α→ β)→ β) 8, Def.
10.(α→ β) ∧α→ β 9, CL
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Ad (b)
1. (α ≡ (α ≡ α))→ ((α ≡ α)→ α) SCI4, CL
2. (α ≡ α)→ (α→ α) 1, CL, Def.
3.α→ α 2, SCI1
Ad (c)
1. (α ≡ α) ≡ ((α ≡ α) ≡ (α ≡ α)) SCI1, CL, RQF
2. (α ≡(α ≡ α))→ [(α ≡ α) ≡ ((α ≡ α) ≡ (α ≡ α)))] 1, CL
3. (α ≡(α ≡ α))→ [(α≡(α≡α))≡((α≡(α≡α))≡(α ≡(α)))] 2, Ext
4.α→ α 3, Def.
Ad (G) Let α be a thesis of AE+. Hence and from (SCI1), (CL) and (RQF),
formula ‘α ≡ (α ≡ α)’ is a thesis of AE+. 
As expected, the theorem concerning the expressibility of the modal-
contents criterion in AE+ applies here.
Theorem 7. ‘(α ≡ β) ≡ ((α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β))’ ∈ AE+.
Proof.
1. (α ≡ β)→ [(α↔ α) ≡ ((α↔ α) ≡ (α↔ α))] CL, SCI1, RQF
2. (α ≡ β)→ [(α↔ β) ≡ ((α↔ β) ≡ (α↔ β) ≡ (α↔ β))] 1, Ext
3. (α ≡ β)→ (α↔ β) 2, Def.
4. (α ≡ β)→ ((α ≡ α) ≡ (α ≡ α)) SCI1, CL
5. (α ≡ β)→ ((α ≡ α) ≡ (β ≡ β)) 4, Ext
6. (α ≡ β)→ (α ‖ β) 5, Def.
7. ((α↔ β)∧(α ‖ β))∧[((α↔ β) ∧ α)≡((α↔ β) ∧ β)]→(α ≡ β) (+)
8. ((α↔ β) ∧ α) ≡ ((α↔ β) ∧ β) CL, RQF
9. (α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β)→ (α ≡ β) 7, 8, CL
10. (α ≡ β)↔ ((α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β)) 3, 6, 9, CL
11. (α ≡ β) ≡ ((α↔ β) ∧ (α ‖ β)) 10, RQF
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